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Abstract 
This introduction to this special issue argues that network breakdowns play an important 
and unacknowledged role in the shaping and emergence of scientific knowledge. It 
focuses on transnational scientific networks from the early modern Republic of Letters to 
21st-century globalized science. It attempts to unite the disparate historiography of the 
early modern Republic of Letters, the literature on 20
th
-century globalization, and the 
scholarship on Actor-Network Theory. We can perceive two, seemingly contradictory 
changes to scientific networks over the past four hundred years. At the level of 
individuals, networks have become increasing fragile, as developments in communication 
and transportation technologies, and emergence of regimes of standardization and 
instrumentation have made it easier both to create new constellations of people and 
materials, and to replace and rearrange them. But at the level of institutions, 
collaborations have become much more extensive and long-lived, with single projects 
routinely outlasting even the arc of a full scientific career. In the modern world, the 
strength of institutions and macro-networks often relies on ideological regimes of 
standardization and instrumentation that can flexibly replace elements and individuals at 
will.  
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What happens when scientific networks break down? If the Catholic Church condemns 
you to house arrest in Florence, how can you, Galileo, manage to remain in touch with 
your scholarly contacts locally, in Rome, and abroad (Findlen and Marcus, 2017)? Or, if 
you are a 21st-century lab scientist, and your collaborative project falls apart over the 
interpretation of your results, how do you recalibrate the work of your research team, find 
new partners, and branch into new directions (Lakoff, 2017)? This special issue seeks 
answers to these questions, and investigates the nature and consequences of network 
breakdowns across history, from the early moder period to today. This introductory 
article offers a highly selective review of the current historiography on scientific 
networks, with a special focus on their disappearance and transformation in the face of 
natural, personal, social and political adversities. In reviewing this historiography, I 
especially focus on three major questions. What material and social factors may cause 
networks to fall apart? Does the dissolution of scientific networks have negative or 
positive effects on the production of knowledge? How do long-term historical 
developments influence the causes and effects of network breakdowns? To answer these 
questions, I make a number of brief theoretical points and provide the preliminary sketch 
of a historical framework for dealing with failures and disappearances.  
There are various kinds of networks. A network can be constituted by a small 
group of people tied together in a project, such as members of a laboratory or editors of a 
journal. A network can be a well-defined, large-scale project, organization or institution 
that connects people across continents and generations. A number of people connected 
through weak ties who do not necessarily share common goals, participate in the same 
project, or work in the same organization, can also make up a network; indeed, as 
Milgram (1967) has shown, the whole of humanity can be understood to form one 
network, connected through weak ties with six degrees of separation. And, as Actor-
Network Theory (ANT) describes, humans and non-humans form alliances and networks 
to ensure their survival and achieve their goals (Latour, 2005; Law and Hassard, 1999). 
In this latest iteration, the network is not only one of the many features of the world 
around us, but is the foundational element. This paper and the special issue take a broad 
view of networks, including such cognates as assemblage, commons or rhizome (Deleuze 
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and Guattari, 2004, Ong and Collier, 2005). They discuss a variety of networks with 
strong and weak ties, with human and non-human actors, but they do not necessarily 
commit themselves to the ontological primacy of networks. As Biagioli (2017) reminds 
us in this issue, networks are not the only explanatory framework available for 
understanding and interpreting how science works. They are no more than a helpful 
analytical tool, and work best when paired together with concepts such as commons, 
institutions, humans, instruments or things. For how else could networks break down and 
disappear, if there weren’t other things to replace them? Latour (2013), too, 
acknowledges the ontological poverty of ANT, and proposes complementary explanatory 
schemas. 
 
From growth to rupture 
 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) tends to focus on beginnings and growth. From 
the early Sociology of Scientific Knowledge to recent works on the circulation of 
knowledge, scholars have investigated in detail how scientific networks are established 
and spread, and scrutinized how consensus is reached, so that local knowledge turns 
global and universal (Collins, 1985, Galison, 1987). Much of this literature has focused 
on the formation of scientific consensus, and its debates have centered on the question 
whether natural or social factors are responsible for reaching agreement. Arguably, 
scholars in STS have been interested in the formation of networks (and/or consensus) 
because they share the belief that, by and large, scientific knowledge ultimately does 
appear to become universal as it spreads along networks, even if only for socio-political 
reasons (for qualifications, see Tsing, 2005).  
The recent literature on the circulation of knowledge is often fueled by a similar 
concern about how local knowledge spreads across cultural, political and temporal 
boundaries (Anderson, 2008; Cook, 2007; Raj, 2007). As Secord (2004) has argued, ‘the 
spread of knowledge, its global ubiquity and circulation,’ is the major question of history 
of science in the new millennium, and, for most historians, the answer to this question 
seems to be transnational networks (Herran et al., 2012). Moreover, even when critical of 
the mainstream globalization literature, historians and STS scholars tend to accept its 
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major tenet that the modern world and modern science are characterized by increasing 
connectivity, the fast sharing of information, and the global, often irreversible spread of 
knowledge (e.g. Jasanoff and Martello, 2004; for historians’ similar fascination with 
networks, see Bell, 2013). Although historians of science are wary of whiggish 
narratives, they have no problems with equating the growth of networks with historical 
success. Latour’s Actor-Network Theory, for example, explains success through the 
growth of networks. While some of Latour’s work (e.g. Aramis, Latour, 1996) is more 
ambiguous about the possibility of distinguishing between network successes and 
apparent failures, the classical formulation of ANT argues that both human and non-
human agents form alliances to win and survive, and the success of scientific theory (or, 
indeed, anything else), is simply explained by the number of allies an agent can enlist. 
The Pasteurization of France explained Pasteur’s cultic status by detailing how he was 
able to manipulate an army of minions (Latour, 1993). 
Yet endings are just as important as beginnings. As Strathern (1996) has argued in 
response to Latour’s version of ANT, one needs to cut the network to make it succeed as 
a distinct entity. Networks gain identity by the boundaries they establish. Without 
boundaries, networks could grow unchecked and, if the bigger network always wins, just 
one network would eventually encompass the whole world, a world in which separate 
identities and distinctive features are dissolved. Philosophically speaking, it is only by 
setting limits to network growth that one can differentiate between different entities or 
identities. Otherwise, we would end up blackboxing the whole world.   
 Strathern claims convincingly that it is precisely the imperfect and temporary 
nature of alliances that gives networks power, shape and a distinct identity. Translated 
into STS, Strathern’s argument suggests that scientific communities are not eternal or 
omnipresent. The development of science is not necessarily the result of a growth of 
networks. It is not the ever-growing accumulation of previously acquired knowledge 
along the same network. The acquisition of human and non-human allies, the growth of 
impressive citation counts, and the development of the largest correspondence network 
are not the only strategies and markers of achieving scientific success. Sometimes, it is 
necessary to limit and even break networks both to determine a field’s identity and to 
achieve breakthroughs. In this respect, Strathern’s work on identity formation finds 
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resonance with studies of demarcation, which examine how science is distinguished from 
pseudoscience in everyday life, and how disciplinary boundaries are established within 
science (Lamont and Molnar 2002; Laudan, 1983; Popper, 2005). While it is clear that 
there is no clear-cut philosophical and methodological difference between science and 
pseudoscience, the sociological and rhetorical importance of such demarcations is beyond 
dispute (Fuller, 1991; Gieryn, 1999; Gordin, 2012). As Biagioli (1990) has shown, 
Galileo’s conscious decision to break with the Aristotelian terminology of the Jesuits, 
which he pretended not even to understand, helped him establish the identity of his own 
research paradigm. Similarly, as Vedel and Irwin argue, it is by the constant alignment, 
unalignment, and realignment of professional interests and identities that academics and 
industry scientists are able to successfully collaborate and break collaborations as 
dictated by their own interests (Vedel and Irwin, 2017).  
A study of breakdowns takes a step beyond demarcation. Historians have shown 
convincingly how the delimitation of scientific networks does not result in a total 
destruction of communications across boundaries. While limits help shape a network's 
identity, they often remain porous and do not break all types of contact (for a similar 
analysis of the ‘pollution of the commons’ in this issue, see Biagioli, 2017). The 
establishment of disciplinary boundaries might still facilitate communication amongst 
networks through ‘boundary objects’, and feisty scholarly duels between opposing camps 
still yield citation counts for one’s opponents (Star and Griesemer, 1989). As it happens, 
scientific debate and the vocal ostracization of anti-scientific propaganda do not 
necessarily result in the annihilation or the weakening of the other side. Recent research 
shows, for example, that vaccination campaigns that debunk anti-vaccination myths do 
not lead to higher vaccination rates, even when the public appears to be swayed by the 
argument of the campaigners (Nyhan et al., 2014). The historiography has examined in 
much less detail how total radio silence might be a more effective strategy in breaking 
alliances, severing contacts and establishing new fields. Stalinist politics, for example, 
first attacked its enemies by putting them on the stage of court trials, and then, once they 
were disappeared, their names were completely dropped from circulation (Lukács, 1962). 
It is important to emphasize that, as in the case of Stalinist Soviet Union, the 
severance of contacts does not happen naturally and inevitably. In many cases, powerful 
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material, social and political forces are required to stop the circulation of information, 
people, and material objects, and to fragment and reshape scientific consensus. While 
loose networks between distant and badly connected groups might dissolve with relative 
ease when a few go-betweens disappear, more tightly-knit organizations, with strong and 
numerous ties between the members, have much more staying power. As Merton (1968) 
has argued, bureaucratic organizations can often become behemoths that are hard to 
disrupt, or to bring into new directions. Similarly, once established, flows of knowledge 
tend to have some inertia, and explicit, ‘disruptive’ pressure is needed to stop them or to 
redirect them into new directions (Christensen, 1997).  
Indeed, while the current emphasis on the emergence and growth of networks 
suggests a picture of the development of science as cumulative growth, a focus on 
network breakdowns reveals a more nuanced picture of the haphazard, fluctuating nature 
of scientific change, punctuated by discontinuities such as Foucauldian epistemic shifts or 
Kuhnian paradigm shifts (Foucault, 1970; Kuhn, 1962). Few scholars apply Kuhn’s ideas 
of paradigm change in their historical research these days, and most believe that change 
happens in a piecemeal process (Biagioli, 2012). Yet scientific consensus is constantly in 
flux, driven to and fro by changing material conditions and social, commercial and 
political pressures, where different kinds of knowledge are rejected and others accepted 
at different times. As science develops, some professional communities gain ascendancy 
for a decade or two, while others lose importance for a while, only to regain it again. 
Translating Kuhn into sociological terms (something Kuhn himself would not have 
necessarily embraced), we can argue that at the juncture of paradigm change, some 
scientific networks break down, while others emerge. As Keller (1983) shows incisively, 
for example, the geneticist Barbara McClintock was able to carve out new paths for 
science because her sex and maverick personality alienated her from the mainstream of 
biochemical research in genetics in the 1940s (but see Comfort, 2003). She was only 
connected to a few scholars, closeted off with her close collaborators in Cold Spring 
Harbor, and the majority of scholars in modern genetics (her larger scholarly network) 
dismissed her ideas. While these features had high personal costs for McClintock, they 
ultimately contributed to a highly original and successful research paradigm that was 
vindicated in the 1970s (for similar examples, see Davis, 1997; Schiebinger, 2004). 
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Breaking networks, producing knowledge 
 
Ruptures in social networks play an important role not only in the process of establishing 
disciplinary and scientific identities. They can catalyze the production of knowledge as 
they help scientists cope with the natural limitations of human life. Networking is time-
consuming and, while it has beneficial effects because of knowledge spillovers, it might 
also take a researcher away from other work. As scholars well know, well-networked 
scientists often have little time to perform research, and instead spend their time 
preparing research grants and supervising postdocs. While research indicates that, in 
general, increased collaborations lead to publication productivity, Lee and Bozeman 
(2005) have shown that this is not a direct, linear correlation. First of all, there is a limit 
to the number of collaborators with whom a scientist can productively engage. In their 
sample, Lee and Bozeman found no scientist who worked with more than 43 
collaborators during a twelve-month period. Even Pál Erdős, the most collaborative 
mathematician of all times, had only 511 co-authors during his eccentric life, and was 
able to achieve this only by breaking with the traditional kinship networks of marriage 
and sedentarism (Erdős Number Project, 2014). Moreover, especially in developing 
countries where there are high transactions costs to setting up collaborations, an increase 
in the size of one’s professional network does not necessarily increase productivity 
(Duque et al., 2005; Sooryamoorthy and Shrum, 2007; but see Sooryamoorthy, 2014). 
Perhaps, networking skills and analytical ability could even be negatively correlated at 
one level. This was one of the reasons why René Descartes decided to selectively 
withdraw from contemporary networks of correspondence. To establish himself as the 
modern philosopher, and to have enough time to do research, he decided to isolate 
himself from other, competing versions of reforming scholastic thinking. Exasperated by 
Thomas Hobbes’ shoddy mathematics and unpleasant metaphysics, Descartes quickly 
decided to break his correspondence with the English philosopher, writing that he ‘did 
not take … his writings seriously enough to think that I was obliged to spend my time 
refuting it’ (Malcolm, 1994: I/118). If life is finite, one’s networks must be finite, too.  
A Long History of Breakdowns 
 8 
Not all productive network ruptures are the result of a scientist's strategic career 
management. External factors, such as war, natural catastrophes and instrument failures 
can also result in breakdowns of scientific networks, and yet can have a catalytic effect 
on the development of knowledge. As Erich Auerbach (1957: 496) claimed at the end of 
Mimesis, he was only able to finish his masterpiece because of World War II.
 
Separated 
from his beloved books in what he perceived to be provincial Istanbul, he was finally able 
to sit down and write up his ideas in a groundbreaking volume. Like military conflict, 
natural and human-made disasters can also disrupt existing collaborations, and then 
sprout new technoscientific networks. For example, the technopolitical explosion of 
Chernobyl quickly pulled together medical professionals from Moscow to Los Angeles, 
who all sought to profit from the experience of treating patients exposed to high levels of 
radiation; then, as interest in the patients faded, these collaborations quickly disbanded, 
leaving the patients to their fate in post-Chernobyl, post-socialist Ukraine and Belarus 
(Petryna, 2003). One could observe similar phenomena in the case of the gas leak 
incident of Bhopal, one of the worst industrial tragedies in history. As Fortun (2001: ix) 
has claimed in her study, the ‘Bhopal disaster has brought many different people 
together, for many different kinds of collaborative work’, locking victims, legal advisors, 
aid organizations, industry representatives and politicians in a bind. While disasters and 
political conflicts disrupt existing networks, they can also contribute to the formation of 
new constellations of knowledge production, although, given the circumstances, one 
might well wish that such new knowledge had never been produced.  
At the level of everyday life, sociologists and philosophers of science have made 
it abundantly clear that material breakdowns are absolutely necessary for the production 
of knowledge or the shaping of scientific research. In terms of experimental systems, 
composed of assemblages of humans, instruments, protocols and data, science progresses 
precisely by the unexpected twists and turns of experimental findings: The emergence of 
knowledge is conditional on the iterative rupture of différance between the researchers’ 
expected and acquired results (Rheinberger, 1992). For large scientific instruments such 
as the Hubble telescope, it is the default to be in a state of disrepair, and projects to 
rectify their breakdowns bring forward much new knowledge about how those 
instruments, the operators of the instruments, and the whole universe work (Schaffer, 
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2011). As these cases reveal, breakdowns bring forward new constellations and networks 
of knowledge production. Yet it would be a mistake to reduce such network ruptures to 
the simple, flexible rearrangement of constitutive elements. When the Iron Curtain 
disrupted and limited the pre-War technological cooperation between Western and 
Eastern Europe (Mehilli, 2014; Vargha, 2014), when the grandmothers of the Argentinian 
disappeared lost control of the DNA identification techiques they helped develop (Smith, 
2017), some things got irredeemably lost, for better or worse. And if studies of networks 
continue to focus on emergence, resilience and flexibility, they will fail to account for the 
loss involved in such scenarios.  
 
The historical problem: Changing network ecologies 
 
If network failures are not mere blips in the progress of history, we need to attend to their 
functioning. We need to understand how different networks are vulnerable to different 
types of breakdowns, social and material. We need to understand how breakdowns might 
bring down scientific research, but can also serve to reconstitute it. We need to 
understand that there is a history to breakdowns, and to develop a typology that could 
help us understand how different kinds of networks exhibit proneness to different kinds 
of failures.
1
 In the rest of this paper, I examine the different breakdown patterns of 
projects pursued in loose networks, dominated by one actor and tied by weak links, and 
of tightly connected, targeted research collaborations, often done in institutions or formal 
organizations. As I argue, scientific networks end for highly different reasons in these 
two different constellations of knowledge production. The research projects of loosely 
connected scholarly networks tend to dissolve with the death of the key human actors. 
Tightly connected collaborative research projects, in contrast, do not disappear with the 
deaths of humans, but when the political or bureaucratic ideology governing them 
collapses. While my primary aim is to highlight the diverging patterns of rupture in two 
different network ecologies, I also make a subsidiary, chronological claim. I contend that, 
by and large, loosely connected networks dominated the scientific research of the early 
modern period, while long-term collaborative projects became typical for science only 
from the end of the eighteenth century onwards.  
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Early modern networks  
 
In recent years, historians have come to agree that networks dominated early modern 
science. Some have argued that this period was remarkable because of the Republic of 
Letters, a strikingly homogenous network consisting almost entirely of European male 
scholars (Daston, 1991; Goldgar, 1995; Goodman, 1996; Habermas, 1991). Others have 
emphasized, instead, that modern science emerged from the global interaction of 
European artisans, African slaves, Muslim ulamas and Chinese traders, a highly 
heterogeous network (Raj, 2007; Roberts, 2011; Schiebinger, 2004; Schiebinger and 
Swan, 2005). Despite these differences, I would suggest, both the Republic of Letters and 
the heterogenous, global networks of the early modern period were loosely-knit networks 
organized around individual people, and they dissolved when those individuals died. 
While the Republic of Letters as an organizing concept – under the ethos of disinterested 
scholarly research – may have united scholars across centuries, it did not result in long-
term, structured, tightly-knit collaborations around a commonly shared goal. While early 
modern globalization might have resulted in multi-generational trading networks that 
survived for centuries, such as the Dutch or the English East India Companies, these 
institutions did not foster focused scientific research on a particular problem for long 
decades, with the potential exception of navigational science (Huigen et al., 2010). They 
only facilitated the circulation of knowledge through weak ties and across geopolitical 
boundaries, without formulating a coherent long-term science policy (Harris, 1996; Lux 
and Cook, 1998). As the recent literature on go-betweens has shown, most concentrated 
knowledge exchanges survived only as long as a particular agent, such as Edward 
Bancroft or James Dinwiddie, was active and present on a site (Schaffer et al., 2009). As 
Findlen and Marcus’ (2017) article in this issue exemplifies, it makes perfect sense for 
early modern studies to understand the growth, fluctuation and dispersion of networks as 
conditioned by the actions and lifespan of one charismatic figure, such as Galileo.  
Most scholars agree that, with the exception of scientific academies, the networks 
of the Republic of Letters were characterized by weak ties. Grafton (2009: 10) writes that 
this institution aimed to cross ‘political, linguistic and religious borders’, or, to quote 
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Waquet (1989: 490), it gave a ‘sense of unity and solidarity to the learned’. In this world, 
scientific activities were often organized around the interests of individual human actors, 
rather than around bureaucratic techniques or communitarian ideologies. It is very 
difficult to find a sustained, collaborative scientific project in the early modern period 
that was designed to last beyond the founders’ lifetime. Individual figures were 
responsible for running even the largest scientific projects in the period, such as Buffon’s 
Natural History or Diderot’s Encyclopédie, and were finished either at death or even 
earlier. In the field of the physical sciences, no 17
th
- or 18
th
-century astronomer 
developed an observational standard that could unite generations of astronomers, as it 
would happen with the Carte du ciel a few centuries later. Tycho Brahe’s observatory in 
Uraniborg famously collapsed when the aristocrat fell out of royal favor, and his 
collaborative project of the observation of the heavens was not continued after his death 
(Thoren, 1990; Mosley, 2007). Other disciplines were no different. When early modern 
natural history experienced an information overload with the exponential growth of the 
number of known plant species, one would think natural historians might have devised a 
collaborative, multi-generational project for surveying and classifying all species. Yet 
this did not happen, and instead individual scholars took up the burden of establishing a 
classificatory system for all species. Take, for example, the case of the Oxford botanist 
James Sherard, who decided to survey the whole of botanical literature on his own, and 
began to write a comprehensive dictionary and encyclopedia of the plant world, which 
stopped only when death intervened. His successor, Johann Jacob Dillenius was similarly 
optimistic, but he too died before completing the manuscript, which languishes in the 
Bodleian today (Margocsy, 2010). Similarly, while during his lifetime Linnaeus was able 
to enlist an impressive number of his students (the apostles of Linnaeus) to collect 
information for him during their travels in the global pursuit for botanical knowledge, this 
network quickly dissolved with the Swedish master’s death in 1778 (Sörlin, 2008). While 
individual manuscripts might have survived the deaths of their authors (e.g. the 
posthumous, 1630s publication of the Insectorum sive minimorum animalium historia of 
Thomas Moffett, based on the notes of Conrad Gesner from a century before), the latter-
day editors of these publications hardly ever observed the intentions and methodologies 
of the original author (Neri, 2011).
2
 Even in the field of ecclesiastical history, a highly 
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collaborative discipline strongly supported by the churches of Europe, most projects were 
limited to the lifetime of one scholar. No church historian intentionally set up a scholarly 
project that would span several generations, although it was eminently clear that church 
history was a massive enterprise. Even Jean Bolland originally thought that his Acta 
sanctorum could be completed during his own lifetime, though, in reality, the project 
would not be finished until 1940 (Knowles, 1958). 
Arguably, the scientific academies and societies that began to emerge in the 17th 
century were held together by strong ties, and not only weak links, and some scholars 
have argued that it was precisely these stable institutions that heralded the dawn of 
modern science (David, 2005; McClellan, 1985). The French Académie des sciences, the 
Accademia del Cimento, and even the Royal Society were hierarchical organizations that 
did not exude the spirit of democratic egalitarianism, as the Republic of Letters did. Yet 
these organizations did not usually foster an institutional culture of long-term, 
collaborative research. First of all, many academies survived only for a generation, and 
ceased activities after a few decades. The Accademia del Cimento, for example, was the 
plaything of Prince Leopoldo de’ Medici, and dissolved only ten years after its 
foundation, when two of its key members left the court for better paying jobs (Knowles 
Middleton, 1971: 309-330). Similarly, the Frankfurt Society for Learning ended its 
activities only fourteen years after its founding, when members’ interest petered out.3 
While the Royal Society has survived to this day, each early president led its research 
into distinctly new directions, and the personal interests of its secretaries determined the 
contours of its correspondence network (Miller, 1998; Rusnock, 1999). Things began to 
change slowly when the cameralist state expressed an interest in enrolling scientific 
academies and other institutions in its service, although even then most academy projects 
lasted at most a decade. These developments first occurred in the late eighteenth century, 
when the Spanish empire launched a series of coordinated botanical expeditions to 
explore the flora of its colonies. The united visual epistemology of this project was 
designed precisely to maintain a standard method of observation across a large number of 
expeditions, even when individual scientists died and the royal administration had 
changed (Bleichmar, 2012).
4
 The rule of humans was replaced by standardized material 
and visual technologies.  
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If humans were the key component of early modern networks, they were also their 
major and crucial vulnerability. Of course, the early modern period was an era of limited 
and failing communications, which resulted in minor breakdowns. Letters did not get 
delivered, ships carrying specimens sank, and instruments repeatedly failed, but people 
were equipped to deal with such eventualities, and such failures did not destroy 
collaborative enterprises. Living in Poland, for instance, the Dutch-German naturalist 
Johann Philip Breyne knew that he would occasionaly have to wait for two or three years 
before his correspondents abroad got back to him. This did not bother him overly, he was 
only worried that such a lack of response indicated the passing of his distant friends. 
When his friend and patron Hans Sloane was close to dying in London, Breyne made 
every effort to ensure that his last and concluding letter safely reached the English 
collector, providing a closure to his exchanges with the correspondent who opened up the 
networks of England to him.
5
 While one could always resend a letter, and perform a new 
measurement if an instrument failed, there was no established method to replace a human 
correspondent. Death put an end to communication and to scientific collaborations.  
 
The world of modernity 
 
If the early modern world of science was marked by the establishment of loose ties 
between independently active researchers, which broke down at the moment of death, 
many modern technoscientific networks are marked by collectivization. The long 
nineteenth century saw the emergence of long-term international research collaborations, 
the establishment of corporate research, and state-sponsored big science (e.g. Rankin, 
2017). These were much more tightly organized and often institutionalized networks, 
designed with the express aim of lasting well beyond the lifespan of a single scientist. 
The reason for the emergence of such long-term networks was partly due to the changing 
fate of political economics. Early modern sovereigns were frequently entertained by their 
courtly scientists, such as the Medici pet Galileo, but it was only in the nineteenth century 
that political leaders and economic corporations began to invest in science as a means of 
improving their economic performance in the long run. Yet states, corporations or 
scientific organizations could only design long-term projects if they agreed that scientific 
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networks no longer needed to be maintained by the charisma of an individual luminary 
like Newton or a laborious networker like Oldenburg. One had to have a strong belief in 
the power of material and paper technologies to maintain long-term, long-distance 
scientific research, or, alternatively, in a communitarian society where a shared ideology 
could unite scientists across generations. In the long-term scientific projects of 
modernity, there was a shared belief that any individual scientist could be replaced by 
another equally competent one, because the mainstays of these networks were 
standardized instruments, bureaucracies and ideologies. The emergence of these networks 
did not result in the disappearance of the earlier, individual-centered, small-scale projects, 
which still pepper the landscape of science. The 21
st
-century funding system actually 
favors the formation of short-term collaborations that dissolve at the end of each grant 
cycle (for examples of such short-term collaborations, see Lakoff, 2017; Biagioli, 2017). 
Nonetheless, long-term planning for scientific projects is now a possibility, which was 
not the case in the early modern era's loosely knit networks.  
The historiography has dissected in great detail how modern nation states and 
commercial organizations developed a growing interest in scientific research. While the 
Republic of Letters scholarship has emphasized how scholarly networks spread across 
religious and political boundaries, the historians of 20
th
-century technoscience instead 
focus precisely on how international politics, nation states and capitalism shape the 
emergence of networks (Jasanoff and Martello, 2004; Krige and Barth, 2006; Petryna et 
al., 2006). Modern states and companies provide financial and logistic support for the 
long-term maintenance of scientific networks. As historians have argued, such networks 
then collapse together with the change of a political order. For example, political 
pressures played an important role in the replacement of the International Association of 
Academies by the pro-Allied International Research Council during World War I 
(Kevles, 1971). Networks collapse with regime changes in the political and economic 
world order. As Herran et al. (2012) argue, ‘special geopolitical factors’ can help us 
understand ‘the role of science in the administration of global affairs’, or, as Ong and 
Collier (2005) claim, late 20
th
-century science can be described as a ‘global assemblage’, 
where neoliberalism and global politics shape together how science is practiced and gains 
a universal reach. In recent years, scholars of the transnational politics of science have 
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focused especially on the global Cold War, while critics of the neoliberal economic 
regime have paid most attention to the emergence of the global commerce of knowledge 
from the 1980s, offering the slightly exaggerated impression that, with the end of the 
Cold War, the political networks of science were simply replaced by the globalization of 
trade (Hayden, 2003; Hecht, 2011; Lakoff, 2005; Petryna, 2009). 
Yet the emphasis on politics and economics does not fully explain the 
transformation of scientific networks in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and why 
the collapse of scientific networks does not fully coincide with the change of political and 
economic regimes. Long-term (and long-distance) scientific networks could only emerge 
when the personality of the scientist ceased to be the primary driver of a network. The 
nineteenth century saw the emergence of two different discourses and associated material 
practices that provided a modus operandi for long-term networks. The charisma of the 
scientist could be replaced by a belief that mechanized protocols, paper technologies, and 
standardized instruments would sustain the coherence and unity of a scientific network. 
In addition, the personality of the scientist could also be replaced by faith in a concertedly 
acting community of scientists united in the search for a better society. Mechanization, 
communism or a combination of the two could replace the Republic of Letters.  
The development of large-scale scientific projects, such as the Carte du Ciel or 
the Internationale Gradmessung was made possible by the advent of mechanical 
objectivity (Daston and Galison, 2008). Extensive scientific networks and institutions, 
such as the observatory, replaced the master scientist at the helm with instruments and 
algorithms that were carefully calibrated to withstand the personal idiosyncrasies of ever-
changing users (Aubin et al., 2010, Lamy 2007). The multi-generational project of the 
Carte du Ciel could only survive because of the precise coordination of its members. 
Although its initiators expected that they would be able to map the coordinates of the 
starry sky within six or eight years, they soon realized that the project would run much 
longer. As a result, they began to pay special attention to the network’s ‘coordination and 
homogeneity’, so as to ensure its success in the long run (Lamy, 2008: 46). Alder (1998) 
has shown similarly that the late-eighteenth century French military state (a pre-cursor of 
19
th
-century developments) could devise pre-Fordist mass manufacturing networks 
because it developed a system of standardization that could produce functionally 
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equivalent elements while tolerating for individual discrepancies. Human contributors to 
scientific networks became replaceable elements, coordinated by the standardization of 
observational and experimental techniques. In early modern networks, the periodic 
failures of postal systems could be tolerated by maintaining the illusion that charismatic 
people were at the real center of scientific networks. With the coming of modernity, the 
failure and death of people could be tolerated by maintaining the illusion of perfect 
mechanical rules. Networks died when instrumental regimes underwent a change. 
Yet mechanization was not the only way to develop long-term, concerted 
collaboration of humans, instruments and data. In the early nineteenth-century traveler 
and polymath Alexander von Humbolt’s vision, instruments and humans both willingly 
agreed to participate as morally free citizens of the same polity (Tresch, 2010). 
Humboldt’s instrumental republic was part of the larger, nineteenth-century societal 
transformation that resulted in the emergence of nationalism and communism, two highly 
problematic utopias of the individual’s subsumption under a type of imagined community 
(Anderson, 1991; Tresch, 2012; see also Mrazek, 2002). Science was an important part of 
both nationalist and communist projects. Lipkowitz (2014) has claimed that the French 
Revolution, and especially the Napoleonic era, put an end to the international Republic of 
Letters, laying the foundations of a French national community of science, which, at least 
until the Battle of Borodino, promised to unite all the scientific practitioners of Europe 
under one national flag (Lipkowitz, 2014). The nineteenth century saw the proliferation 
of national scientific languages, fragmenting the united world of Latinity into enclaves 
carefully patrolled by translators (Gordin, 2015; Waquet, 1998). Geological surveys are 
prime examples of national, state or empire-driven projects that subsumed a large number 
of scientists into single coordinated scientific projects; these surveys often lasted decades, 
as in the case of the Geologische Reichsanstalt in Vienna, or even longer, as in the case 
of the Geological Survey of Great Britain (Klemun, 2012; Knell, 2007).  
While thoroughly opposed to the ideological thrust of nationalism, nineteenth- 
and twentieth-century communism similarly embraced the suppression of the individual 
scientist within a larger society, this time under the flag of a class-conscious 
internationalism. This was not just pure ideology, at least when it came to science, but 
also a pragmatic program of developing large-scale and long-term collaborative 
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enterprises. As Graham and Dezhina (2008: 1) have claimed, ‘Soviet science and 
technology were organized in larger units than found elsewhere, and under the control of 
fewer influential individuals.’ The planned economy required a science also carefully 
planned. In the field of communist engineering, some large-scale projects were finished 
in an extremely short time span, such as the White Sea Canal, but others were designed to 
be developed over a long period of time. The Sibaral project famously ran for over fifty 
years, with the express aim of redirecting Siberian rivers to irrigate the dry lands of 
Central Asia. The scientific institutes established in the aftermath of the Bolshevik 
revolution could survive and maintain the same research program for long decades; the 
Vavilov State Optical Institute (established in 1918) still sees its history as one of 
continuous and unbroken development along stable and well-defined research axes 
(Gogolev and Gan, 2007; Kojevnikov, 2002). Similarly, the new academic city of 
Akademgorodok, established in the 1950s to promote Soviet science in Siberia, survives 
to this day as a hotbed of Russian high tech (Josephson, 1997). 
Just as in the world of mechanical objectivity, communist and nationalist 
networks did not break down with the death of an individual. For what was communism 
itself, if not a long-term project of societal engineering, to be achieved through major 
individual sacrifices only in the farthest future? As NKVD leader Nikolai Yezhov 
famously claimed (before he himself was executed), ‘when you cut down the forest, the 
woodchips fly’; every individual could be replaced as long as the network was 
maintained (Medvedev, 1989: 603). While mechanical objectivity could function through 
standardization, bureaucracy and paper technologies, the longevity of communist 
networks was ensured by a mixture of shared ideology and totalitarian surveillance. 
These networks were reconfigured with each shift in communist ideology, and collapsed 
with the political and ideological crash of the Soviet system. As Stalinism took newer and 
newer turns from the 1920s to the 1950s, the networks of avant-garde art, ethnography, 
biology and linguistics were reshaped again and again, with ostracized scientists executed 
or sent to the Gulag (Groys, 1992; Slezkine, 1991). It was not deaths that broke networks 
down. Rather, it was the ideological transformations of scientific networks that caused 
deaths.  
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The complex interaction of mechanized regimes of instrumentation, ideologies of 
communitarianism, and the modern political-economical system explains why, even in 
modernity, network breakdowns do not simply align with military interventions and the 
collapse of the state. Wars have had an obviously large impact on the functioning of 
scientific networks (indeed, their impact has been much bigger than in the era of the 
Republic of Letters,), yet they did not always radically reshape or destroy existing 
scientific networks. The Carte du Ciel project survived both world wars, and ended only 
in the 1970s, when its observational and instrumentational regime became outdated. For 
nationalist and communist scientific networks, one needed the collapse of both state and 
ideology to stop functioning. Thus the project of German science did not suffer a major 
blow with the end of World War I, although took several years until it could again fully 
participate in international collaborations (Windsor, 2014). While Kaiser Wilhelm was 
sent to exile in the Netherlands, the Kaiser Wilhelm Society’s institutes survived and were 
not even renamed during the Weimar Republic (Macrakis, 1993). In contrast, the end of 
World War II signaled both the end of Nazi ideology and the German state. While, as 
many were to bemoan, Nazi scientists were quickly rehabilitated in the West with the 
rising threat of the Cold War, their scientific projects were nonetheless thoroughly 
altered. Eugenics became a thoroughly discredited idea, and Konrad Lorenz, for instance, 
had to refashion his scientific persona, abandoning his earlier project of racial 
purification (Burkhardt, 2005). Similarly, it was the ideological (and not only the 
political) collapse of the Soviet project that resulted in the breakdown of Soviet scientific 
networks. State funding for science dropped radically in the 1990s, the elite situation and 
reputation of scientists suffered a severe blow and, as a result, many scientists emigrated 
to the West, exchanging the isolated networks of the Eastern bloc for the globalized 
world of transnational science. 
 
Conclusion.  
 
Deaths of people, changing regimes of instrumentation, and the collapse of ideologies. 
This brief essay has offered accounts of how different networks have different 
vulnerabilities: early modern loose networks crashed with the death of the individual 
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people at their centers, while modern, long-term, well-defined collaborative projects 
disappeared with the changing regimes of mechanical instrumentation or the shifting 
ideologies of the collective. Clearly, while studies of networks focus on formal 
characteristics, applying the same principles to study humans, viruses and bits, it is 
equally important to investigate qualitatively how humans, instruments and ideologies 
interact in the creation and destruction of networks. In some contexts, killing the human 
destroys the network, but in different contexts, one needs to attack the instrument, or the 
ideologies behind it, to create new constellations for the production of knowledge.  
Equally importantly, a focus on network breakdowns has the potential to offer a 
counter-narrative to whiggish narratives of the progress of science. Instead of examining 
the emergence of networks, and how they come to encompass larger and larger segments 
of global society, it is time to realize how frequently they contract, dissolve and fail to 
maintain themselves. An attention to such ruptures, whether occasioned by the French 
Revolution, outdated instrumental apparatuses or the death of a genius, shows how 
natural knowledge develops by twists and turns, throwing up new paradigms in a 
punctuated fashion. To every story of emergence, one can find a counter-narrative of 
dissolution and failure. Sometimes, the only way to recalibrate science is by breaking the 
networks that sustain it. And this is not always a bad thing, indeed.  
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Notes 
                                                        
1
 Studies of networks, however, frequently categorize networks according to their vulnerabilities (Barabási, 
2002b). While there is a substantial literature that applies complex network theory to scientific networks, 
such quantitative studies focus on establishing the nature of such networks, and less on their vulnerabilities 
(Barabási, 2002a; Ferrary and Granovetter, 2009; Newman, 2001; Owen-Smith and Powell, 2004; Powell 
et al., 2005).  
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2
 The obvious exception is Ulisse Aldrovandi, whose will went into great length specifying how his 
successors should continue his publication project. I thank Paula Findlen for this point.  
3
 MS Uffenbach Folio 13, Staats- und Universitätsbibliothek Göttingen.  
4
 For another long-term project, meteorology in Mannheim, which ended after 15 years of activity because 
of Napoleon’s occupation of the area, see Cassidy (1985).  
5
 Johann Philip Breyne to Peter Collinson, 12 November, 1747, Forschungsbibliothek Gotha Chart A 873. 
On death in patronage networks, see Pumfrey (2004). 
